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Abstract
Recent studies on the adversarial vulnerability of
neural networks have shown that models trained
to be more robust to adversarial attacks exhibit
more interpretable saliency maps than their non-
robust counterparts. We aim to quantify this be-
havior by considering the alignment between in-
put image and saliency map. We hypothesize that
as the distance to the decision boundary grows,
so does the alignment. This connection is strictly
true in the case of linear models. We confirm
these theoretical findings with experiments based
on models trained with a local Lipschitz regular-
ization and identify where the non-linear nature
of neural networks weakens the relation.
1. Introduction
Despite impressive results in a variety of classification tasks
(LeCun et al., 2015), even highly accurate neural network
classifiers are plagued by a vulnerability to so-called adver-
sarial perturbations (Szegedy et al., 2014). These adver-
sarial perturbations are small, often visually imperceptible
perturbations to the network’s input, which however result
in the network’s classification decision being changed. Such
vulnerabilities may pose a threat to real-world deployments
of automated recognition systems, especially in security-
critical applications such as autonomous driving or banking.
This has sparked a large number of publications related to
both the creation of adversarial attacks (Goodfellow et al.,
2014; Kurakin et al., 2016; Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2016)
as well as defenses against these (see (Schott et al., 2018) for
an overview). Apart from the application-focused viewpoint,
the observed adversarial vulnerability offers non-obvious
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Figure 1. An image of a dog (left), the saliency maps of a highly
non-adversarially-robust neural network (middle) and of a more
robust network (right). We observe that the robust network gives a
much clearer indication of what the classifier deems to be discrim-
inative features. Details about saliency and the robustification are
given in section 4. Most figures are best viewed on a screen.
insights into the inner workings of neural networks. One
particular method of defense is adversarial training (Madry
et al., 2018), which aims to minimize a modified training
objective. While this method – like all known approaches
of defense – decreases the accuracy of the classifier, it is
also successful in increasing the robustness to adversarial
attacks, i.e. the perturbations need to be larger on average
in order to change the classification decision.
(Tsipras et al., 2019) also notice that networks that are ro-
bustified in this way show interesting phenomena, which so
far could not be explained. Neural networks usually exhibit
very unstructured saliency maps (gradients of a classifier
score with respect to the network’s input (Simonyan et al.,
2013)) which barely relate to the input image. On the other
hand, saliency maps of robustified classifiers tend to be far
more interpretable, in that structures in the input image also
emerge in the corresponding saliency map, as exemplified
in Figure 1. (Tsipras et al., 2019) describe this as an ’unex-
pected benefit’ of adversarial robustness. In order to obtain a
semantically meaningful visualization of the network’s clas-
sification decision in non-robustified networks, the saliency
map has to be aggregated over many different points in the
vicinity of the input image. This can be achieved either
via averaging saliency maps of noisy versions of the image
(Smilkov et al., 2017) or by integrating along a path (Sun-
dararajan et al., 2017). Other approaches typically employ
modified backpropagation schemes in order to highlight the
discriminative portions of the image. Examples of this in-
clude guided backpropagation (Springenberg et al., 2015)
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and deep Taylor decomposition (Montavon et al., 2017).
In this paper, we show that the interpretability of the saliency
maps of a robustified neural network is not only a side-effect
of adversarial training, but a general property enjoyed by
networks with a high degree of robustness to adversarial
perturbations. We first demonstrate this principle for the
case of a linear, binary classifier and show that the ’inter-
pretability’ is due to the image vector and the respective
image gradient aligning. For the more general, non-linear
case we empirically show that while this relationship is true
on average, the linear theory and the non-linear reality do
not always agree. We empirically demonstrate that the more
linear the model is, the stronger the connection between
robustness and alignment becomes.
2. Adversarial Robustness and Saliency Maps
Since adversarial perturbations are small perturbations that
change the predicted class of a neural network, it makes
sense to define the robustness towards adversarial perturba-
tions via the distance of the unperturbed image to its nearest
perturbed image, such that the classification is changed.
Definition 1. Let F : X → C (with C finite) be a classifier
over the normed vector space (X, ‖ · ‖). We call
ρ(x) = inf
e∈X
{‖e‖ : F (x+ e) 6= F (x)} (1)
the (adversarial) robustness of F in the point x. We call
Ex∼D [ρ(x)] the (adversarial) robustness of F over the dis-
tribution D.
Put differently, the robustness of a classifier in a point is
nothing but the distance to its closest decision boundary.
Margin classifiers like support vector machines (Cortes &
Vapnik, 1995) seek to keep this distance large for the training
set, usually in order to avoid overfitting. (Sokolic´ et al.,
2017) and (Elsayed et al., 2018) also apply this principle
to neural networks via regularization schemes. We point
out that our definition of adversarial robustness does not
depend on the ground truth class label and – given feasible
computability – can approximately be calculated even on
unlabelled data.
In the following, we will always assume X to be a real,
finite-dimensional vector space with the Euclidean norm.
The proofs for the following theoretical statements are found
in the appendix.
2.1. A Motivating Toy Example
We consider the toy case of a linear binary classifier
F (x) = sgn(Ψz(x)) with the so-called score function
Ψz(x) = 〈x, z〉 and fixed z 6= 0, where 〈·, ·〉 denotes the
standard inner product on Rm. A straightforward calcula-
tion (see appendix) shows that the adversarial robustness of
F is given by
ρ(x) =
|〈x, z〉|
‖z‖ =
|〈x,∇Ψz(x)〉|
‖∇Ψz(x)‖ . (2)
Unless stated otherwise, we will always denote with ∇ the
gradient with respect to x. Note that ρ(x) = ‖x‖ · | cos(δ)|,
where δ is the angle between the vectors x and ∇Ψz(x).
This implies that ρ(x) grows with the alignment of x and z
and is maximized if and only if x and z are collinear.
This motivates the following definition.
Definition 2 (Alignment). Let the binary classifier
F : X → {−1, 1}
be defined a.e. by F (x) = sgn(Ψ(x)), where Ψ : X → R
is differentiable in x. We then call ∇Ψ the saliency map of
F with respect to Ψ in x and
α(x) :=
|〈x,∇Ψ(x)〉|
‖∇Ψ(x)‖ , (3)
the alignment with respect to Ψ in x.
The alignment is a measure of how similar the input image
x and the saliency map∇Ψ(x) are. If ‖x‖ = 1, and x and
∇Ψ(x) are zero-centered, this coincides with the absolute
value of their Pearson correlation. For a linear binary classi-
fier, the alignment trivially increases with the robustness of
the classifier.
Generalizing from the linear to the affine case leads to a clas-
sifier of the form F (x) = sgn(〈x, z〉+b), whose robustness
in x is
ρ(x) =
|〈x, z〉+ b|
‖z‖ .
In this case the robustness and alignment do not coincide
anymore. In order to connect these two diverging concepts,
we offer two alternative viewpoints. On the one hand, we
can trivially bound the robustness via the triangle inequality
ρ(x) ≤ α(x) + |b|‖z‖ . (4)
This is particularly meaningful if |b|/‖z‖ is small in compar-
ison to α(x). Alternatively, one can connect the robustness
to the alignment at a different point ξ = x+ b‖z‖
z
‖z‖ , leading
to the relation
ρ(x) = α(ξ). (5)
In the affine case this approach simply amounts to a shift of
the data that is uniform over all data points x. We will see
how these two viewpoints lead to different bounds in the
non-linear case later.
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2.2. The General Case
We now consider the general, n-class case.
Definition 3 (Alignment, Multi-Class Case). Let
Ψ = (Ψ1, . . . ,Ψn) : X → Rn
be differentiable in x. Then for an n-class classifier defined
a.e. by
F (x) = arg max
i
Ψi(x), (6)
we call ∇ΨF (x) the saliency map of F . We further call
α(x) :=
|〈x,∇ΨF (x)(x)〉|
‖∇ΨF (x)(x)‖ , (7)
the alignment with respect to Ψ in x.
2.2.1. LINEARIZED ROBUSTNESS
In general the distance to the decision boundary ρ(x) can
be unfeasible to compute. However, for classifiers built on
locally affine score functions – such as most neural networks
using ReLU or leaky ReLU activations – ρ(x) can easily be
computed, provided the locally affine region is sufficiently
large. To quantify this, define the radius of the locally affine
component of F around x as
l(x) = sup{r | ∀i : Ψi affine in Br(x)},
where Br(x) is the open ball of radius r around x with
respect to the Euclidean metric.
Lemma 1. Let F be a classifier with locally affine score
function Ψ. Assume l(x) ≥ ρ(x). Then
ρ(x) = min
j 6=i∗
Ψi
∗
(x)−Ψj(x)
‖∇Ψi∗(x)−∇Ψj(x)‖ , (8)
for i∗ := F (x) the predicted class at x.
Similar identities were previously also independently de-
rived in (Elsayed et al., 2018) and (Jakubovitz & Giryes,
2018).
Note that while nearly all state-of-the art classification net-
works are piecewise affine, the condition l(x) ≥ ρ(x) is
typically violated in practice. However, the lemma can still
hold approximately as long as the linear approximation to
the network’s score functions is sufficiently good in the rel-
evant neighbourhood of x. This motivates the definition of
the linearized (adversarial) robustness ρ˜.
Definition 4 (Linearized Robustness). Let Ψ(x) be the dif-
ferentiable score vector for the classifier F in x. We call
ρ˜(x) := min
j 6=i∗
Ψi
∗
(x)−Ψj(x)
‖∇Ψi∗(x)−∇Ψj(x)‖ , (9)
the linearized robustness in x, where i∗ := F (x) is the
predicted class at point x.
We later show that the two notions lead to very similar
results, even if the condition l(x) ≥ ρ(x) is violated.
2.2.2. REDUCING THE MULTI-CLASS CASE
In this section, we introduce a toolset which helps bridge
the gap between the alignment and the linearized robustness
of a multi-class classifier. In the following, for fixed x, let
i∗ := F (x) and j∗ be the minimizer in (9). We can assign
F in x a binarized classifier F †x with
F †x(y) := sgn
(
Ψ†x(y)
)
, (10)
where Ψ†x(y) := Ψ
i∗(y)−Ψj∗(y). Its linearized robustness
in y = x is the same as for F . The binarized saliency map,
∇Ψ†x(x) = ∇yΨ†x(y)|y=x and the respective alignment,
α†(x) =
|〈x,∇(Ψi∗ −Ψj∗)(x)〉|
‖∇(Ψi∗ −Ψj∗)(x)‖ , (11)
which we call binarized alignment, offer an alternative,
natural perspective of the above considerations. This is
because for classifiers as defined in (6), the actual score
values do not necessarily carry any information about the
classification decision, whereas the score differences do.
While, roughly speaking, ∇Ψi∗ tells us what F ’thinks’
makes x a member of its predicted class, ∇Ψ†x(x) carries
information what sets x apart from its closest neighboring
class (according to linearization).
In the special case of a linear, multi-class classifier, we have
ρ(x) = ρ˜(x) = α†(x)
and in the linear, binary case Ψ(x) = (〈x, z〉,−〈x, z〉), even
α(x) = α†(x).
3. Decompositions and Bounds for Neural
Networks
3.1. Homogeneous Decomposition
In the previous chapter we have seen that in the case of
binary classifiers, the robustness and binarized alignment
coincide for linear score functions. However, requiring Ψ to
be linear is a stronger assumption than necessary to deduce
the result: It is in fact sufficient for Ψ to be positive one-
homogeneous. Any such function satisfies Ψ(ax) = aΨ(x)
for all a > 0 and x.
Lemma 2 (Linearized Robustness of Homogeneous Clas-
sifiers). Consider a classifier F with positive one-
homogeneous score functions. Then
ρ˜(x) = α†(x). (12)
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In particular, most feedforward neural networks with
(leaky) ReLU activations without biases are positive one-
homogeneous. This observation motivates to split up any
classifier built on neural networks into a homogeneous term
and the corresponding remainder, leading to the following
decomposition result.
Theorem 1 (Homogeneous Decomposition of Neural Net-
works). Let ΨiΘ,b be any logit of a neural network with
ReLU activations (of class N in the appendix). Denote by
Θ the linear filters and by b the bias terms of the network.
Then
ΨiΘ,b(x) = 〈x,∇xΨiΘ,b(x)〉+ 〈b,∇bΨiΘ,b(x)〉
= 〈x,∇xΨiΘ,b(x)〉+
∑
k
bk∂bkΨ
i
Θ,b(x).
(13)
Note that the above vector b includes the running averages
of the means for batch normalization. For ReLU networks,
the remainder term βi(x) := 〈b,∇bΨiΘ,b(x)〉 is locally con-
stant, because it changes only when x enters another locally
linear region. For ease of notation, we will now drop the
subscripts Θ and b.
3.2. Pointwise Bounds
In section 2.1, we introduced two different viewpoints for
affine linear, binary classifiers which connect the robustness
to the alignment. In a similar vein to inequality (4) and
equality (5), upper bounds to the linearized robustness de-
pending on the alignment can be given for neural networks.
In the following, we will write v := v/‖v‖ for v 6= 0.
Again, in the following we fix x and write i∗ = F (x) and
j∗ for the minimizer in j from equation (9).
Theorem 2. Let g := ∇Ψi∗(x). Furthermore, let
g† := ∇(Ψi∗ −Ψj∗)(x) and β† := βi∗(x)−βj∗(x). Then
ρ˜(x) ≤ α†(x) + |β
†|
‖g†‖ (14)
≤ α(x) + ‖x‖ · ‖g† − g‖+ |β
†|
‖g†‖ . (15)
Distances on the unit sphere (such as ‖g† − g‖) can be
converted to angles through the law of cosines. For the
above inequalities to be reasonably tight, the angle between
g and g† needs to be small and |β†|/‖g†‖ needs to be small
in comparison to α†(x). In this case, the alignment should
roughly increase with the linearized robustness.
Theorem 3. Let ξ := x + β
†
‖g†‖
g†
‖g†‖ and γ := ∇Ψi
∗
(ξ),
with g† and β† defined as in the previous theorem. Then
ρ˜(x) ≤ |〈ξ, γ〉|‖γ‖ + ‖ξ‖ · ‖g
† − γ‖, (16)
and if additionally F (x) = F (ξ), then
ρ˜(x) ≤ α(ξ) + ‖ξ‖ · ‖g† − γ‖.
Depending on the sign of β†, the shifted image ξ can either
be understood as a gradient ascent or descent iterate for
maximizing/minimizing Ψi
∗ −Ψj∗ . This theorem assimi-
lates β†(x) into x, providing an upper bound to ρ˜(x) that
depends on α(ξ). The sensibility of this hinges on ξ being
reasonably close to x and γ having a low angle with g†.
If the error terms in inequalities (14), (15) and (16) are
small, these inequalities thus provide a simple illustration
why more robust networks yield more interpretable saliency
maps.
Nevertheless, the right-hand side may be much larger than
ρ˜(x), if the inner product between an image and its respec-
tive saliency map are almost orthogonal. This is because the
Cauchy-Schwarz inequality (see the proofs in the appendix)
provides a large upper bound in this case. The inequalities
rather serve as an explanation of how the various terms of
alignment may deviate from the linearized robustness in the
case of a neural network.
3.3. Alignment and Interpretability
The above considerations demonstrate how an increase in
robustness may induce an increase in the alignment between
an input image and its respective saliency map. The ini-
tial observation – which was previously described as an
increase in interpretability – may thus be ascribed to this
phenomenon. This is especially true in the case of nat-
ural images, as exemplified in Figure 1. There, what a
human observer would deem an increase in interpretability,
expresses itself as discriminative portions of the original
image reappearing in the saliency map, which naturally
implies a stronger alignment. The concepts of alignment
and interpretability should however not be conflated com-
pletely: In the case of quasi-binary image data like MNIST,
0-regions of the image render the inner product in equa-
tion (7) invariant with respect to the saliency map in this
region, even if the saliency map e.g. assigns relevance to
the absence of a feature in this region. Note however that
the saliency map in this region still influences the alignment
term through the division by its norm. Additionally, the
alignment is also not invariant to the images’ representation
(color space, shifts, normalization etc.). Still, for most types
of image data an increase in alignment in discriminative
regions should coincide with an increase in interpretability.
4. Experiments
In order to validate our hypothesis, we trained several mod-
els of different adversarial robustness on both MNIST (Le-
Cun et al., 1990) and ImageNet (Deng et al., 2009) using
double backpropagation (Drucker & Le Cun, 1992). For a
neural network fθ with a softmax output layer, this amounts
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Figure 2. The median alignment increases with the median robust-
ness of the model on ImageNet. Furthermore, the more elaborate
attacks consistently find smaller adversarial perturbations than the
simple gradient attack. The linearized robustness estimator pro-
vides a rather realistic estimation of the algorithmically calculated
robustness.
to minimizing the modified loss
1
N
N∑
i=1
[
L(fθ(x(i)), y(i)) + λ · ‖∇L(fθ(x(i)), y(i))‖2
]
(17)
over the parameters θ = (Θ, b). Here, {(x(i), y(i))}i=1,...,N
is the training set and L denotes the negative log-likelihood
error function. The hyperparameter λ ≥ 0 determines the
strength of the regularization. Note that this penalizes the
local Lipschitz constant of the loss. As (Simon-Gabriel
et al., 2018) demonstrate, double backpropagation makes
neural networks more resilient to adversarial attacks. By
varying λ, we can easily create models of different adversar-
ial robustness for the same dataset, whose properties we can
then compare. (Anil et al., 2018) previously noted that Lip-
schitz constrained networks exhibit interpretable saliency
maps (without an explanation), which can be regarded as a
side-effect of the increase in adversarial robustness.
For the MNIST experiments, we trained each of our 16 mod-
els on an NVIDIA 1080Ti GPU with a batch size of 100
for 200 epochs, covering the regularization hyperparameter
range from 10 to 180,000, before the models start to degen-
erate. The used architecture is found in the appendix.
For the experiments on ImageNet, we fine-tuned the pre-
trained ResNet50 model from (He et al., 2016) over 35
epochs on 2 NVIDIA P100 GPUs with a total batch size of
32. We used stochastic gradient descent with a learning rate
of 0.0001 and momentum of 0.99. The learning rate was di-
vided by 10 whenever the error stopped improving. For the
regularization parameter, we chose λ = 104, 104.5, . . . , 107.
The experiments were implemented in Tensorflow (Abadi
et al., 2015).
1.5 2 2.5 3
2.5
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M
[α
(x
)]
Gradient Attack
Projected Gradient Descent
Carlini-Wagner
Linearized Robustness
Figure 3. Similar to Figure 2, the median alignment increases with
the median robustness of the model on MNIST. Towards the end,
some saturation effects are visible.
4.1. Robustness and Alignment
For checking the relation between the alignment and ro-
bustness of a neural network, we created 1000 adver-
sarial examples per model on the respective validation
set. This was realized using the python library Fool-
box (Rauber et al., 2017), which offers pre-defined ad-
versarial attacks, three of which we used in this paper:
The GradientAttack performs a line search for the
closest adversarial example along the direction of the
loss gradient. L2BasicInterativeAttack imple-
ments the projected gradient descent attack from (Ku-
rakin et al., 2016) for the Euclidean metric. Similarly,
CarliniWagnerL2Attack (CW-attack) is the attack
introduced in (Carlini & Wagner, 2017) suited for finding
the closest adversarial example in Euclidean metric. Addi-
tionally, we calculated the linearized robustness ρ˜(x), which
entails calculating n gradients per image for an n-class prob-
lem.
In Figures 2 and 3, we investigate how the median align-
ment depends on the medians of the different conceptions
of robustness. We opted in favor of the median (M ) instead
of the arithmetic mean due to its increased robustness to
outliers, which occurred especially when using the gradient
attack. In the case of ImageNet (Figure 2), an increase in
median alignment with the median robustness is clearly vis-
ible for all three estimates of the robustness. On the other
hand, the alignment for the MNIST data increases with the
robustness as well, but seems to saturate at some point. We
will offer an explanation for this phenomenon later.
We now consider the pointwise connection between ro-
bustness and alignment. In Figure 4 the two variables are
highly-correlated for a model trained on MNIST, pointing
towards the fact that the network behaves very similarly to
a positive one-homogeneous function. There is however no
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Figure 4. The pointwise relationship between ρ˜(x) and α(x), ex-
emplified on a model trained on ImageNet (left) and MNIST (right).
While the two properties are well-correlated on MNIST (fitting the
’averaged’ view from Figure 3), there is no visible correlation in
the case of ImageNet.
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Figure 5. The pointwise relationship between ρ˜(x) and ρ(x), each
calculated for 1000 validation points on a model trained on Im-
ageNet (left) and MNIST (right). ρ(x) was approximately cal-
culated using the CW-attack. In both cases, the correlation is
high.
visible correlation between them on the ImageNet model,
which is a consistent behavior throughout the whole ex-
periment cohort. We will later analyse the source of this
behavior. The increase in median alignment for ImageNet,
M [α(x)] = M [|〈x, g〉|], can still be explained by a statis-
tical argument: If M [〈x, g〉] = 0, as approximately true in
our ImageNet model, then M [α(x)] is the median absolute
deviation of 〈x, g〉. In other words, the graph for ImageNet
in Figure 4 depicts the dispersion of 〈x, g〉. The above ob-
servations also hold well for the binarized alignment.
In Figure 5 a tight correlation between ρ˜(x) and ρ(x) be-
comes evident. Here, the latter has been calculated using
the CW-attack. The linearized robustness model ρ˜ is hence
an adequate approximation of the actual robustness ρ, even
for the highly non-linear neural network models used on
ImageNet. Finally note that all used attacks lead to the same
general behavior of all quantities investigated (see Figures
2 and 3).
4.2. Explaining the Observations
In the last section, we observed some commonalities be-
tween the experiments on ImageNet and MNIST, but also
some very different behaviors. In particular, two aspects
stand out: Why does the median alignment steadily increase
for the observed ImageNet experiments, whereas on MNIST
this stagnates at some point (Figures 2 and 3)? Furthermore,
why are ρ˜(x) and α(x) so highly-correlated on MNIST but
almost uncorrelated on ImageNet (Figure 4)? We turn to
Theorems 2 and 3 for answers.
Theorem 2 states that
ρ˜(x) ≤ α†(x) + |β
†|
‖g†‖ , (18)
where β† is the locally constant term and g† is the saliency
map of the binarized classifier and v = v/‖v‖ for v 6= 0.
In Figure 6, we check how strongly the right-hand side of
inequality (18) is dominated by α†(x), i.e. how large the
influence of the locally linear term is in comparison to the
locally constant term. For ImageNet, this ratio increases
from below 0.55 to almost 0.85, pointing towards a model
increasingly governed by its linearized part. On MNIST, this
ratio strongly decreases over the robustness’s range. Note
however that in the weakly regularized MNIST models,
the right hand side is extremely dominated by the median
alignment in the first place.
A similar analysis can be performed for the second inequal-
ity from Theorem 2,
ρ˜(x) ≤ α(x) + ‖x‖ · ‖g† − g‖+ |β
†|
‖g†‖ , (19)
which additionally makes a step from binarized alignment
to (conventional) alignment.
This leads to an additional error term, making the bound
significantly less tight than in the previous case. In particu-
lar, the proportion of the alignment α on the right-hand side
diminishes, confirming our prediction from section 3.2. Nev-
ertheless, the qualitative behaviors is similar to the previous
case, with the α(x) taking up an increasing fraction of the
right-hand with increasing robustness. For MNIST data, the
ratio varies little compared to the ratio from the last inequal-
ity. This indicates that the remainder term ‖g† − g‖ does
not change too strongly over the set of MNIST experiments
compared to α(x). We thus deduce that the qualitative rela-
tionship between robustness and alignment is fully governed
by the error term introduced in (18), i.e. the locally constant
term of the logit.
We now do the same for the inequality in Theorem 3, which
states that
ρ˜(x) ≤ |〈ξ, γ〉|‖γ‖ + ‖ξ‖ · ‖g
† − γ‖ (20)
for ξ = x+ b
†
‖g†‖
g†
‖g†‖ and γ = ∇ΨF (x)(ξ), which gets rid
of the additive term |β†|/‖g†‖ from (18). Again, in the case
of ImageNet |〈ξ, γ〉| grows more quickly in comparison to
‖g† − γ‖, the distance of the normalized gradients, whereas
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Figure 6. Comparing the size of the summands of inequality (18)
for the various experiments. In the case of ImageNet (left), α†(x)
takes up an increasing fraction of the right-hand side of the inequal-
ity. For MNIST (right), this portion tends to strongly decrease with
the robustness. Note however that in this case, α†(x) starts out
vastly dominating the right-hand side.
50 100 150 200 250 300
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
·10−2
M [ρ˜(x)]
M
[
α
(x
)
|β
† |
/
‖g
† ‖
+
‖x
‖·
‖g
† −
g
‖]
1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2 2.2 2.4 2.6 2.8 3
0.45
0.5
0.55
0.6
M [ρ˜(x)]
M
[
α
(x
)
|β
† |
/
‖g
† ‖
+
‖x
‖·
‖g
† −
g
‖]
Figure 7. Comparing the size of the summands of inequality (19)
for the various experiments. For the ImageNet experiments (left),
the portion of α(x) of the right-hand side of the inequality in-
creases roughly 7-fold. For MNIST (right), this portion stays
roughly constant compared to the variation from Figure 6.
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Figure 8. Comparing the size of the summands of inequality (20)
for the various experiments. In the case of ImageNet (left), the
alignment in ξ takes up an increasingly large portion of the right-
hand side of the inequality. For MNIST (right), this portion stays
roughly constant.
their ratio is approximately constant for MNIST data.
To conclude, we have seen that the upper bounds from The-
orems 2 and 3 provide valuable information in which ways
both the experiments on ImageNet and MNIST are influ-
enced by the respective terms. In the case of ImageNet, we
consistently see the alignment terms growing more quickly
than the other terms. This might indicate that the growth
in alignment stems not only from the growth in the robust-
ness alone, but also from the model becoming increasingly
similar to our idealized toy example. In other words, not
only does the robustness make the alignment grow, but the
connection between these two properties becomes stronger
in the case of ImageNet. This is in agreement with the seem-
ingly superlinear growth of the median alignment in Figure
2.
It is not surprising that a classifier for a problem as complex
as ImageNet is highly non-linear, which makes the (point-
wise) connection between alignment and robustness rather
loose. We hence conjecture that the imposed regularization
increasingly restricts the models to be more linear, thereby
making them more similar to our initial toy example.
For MNIST, the regularization seems to have the opposite
effect: As seen in Figure 6, the binarized alignment ini-
tially dwarfs the correction term |β†|/‖g†‖ introduced by
the locally constant portion of the binarized logit Ψ†x(x).
As the network becomes more robust, Ψ†x(x) is apparently
not dominated by the linear terms anymore, while the influ-
ence of the locally constant terms (i.e. β†) increases. This
hypothesis seems sensible, considering MNIST is a very
simple problem which we tackled with a comparatively shal-
low network. This can be expected to yield a model with a
low degree of non-linearity. The penalization of the local
Lipschitz constant here seems to have the effect of requiring
larger locally constant terms |β†|, in contrast to the models
trained on ImageNet.
We check the validity of these claims by tracking the median
size of |〈x, g†〉| against the median size of |Ψ†x(x)| in Figure
9. On MNIST, M
[|〈x, g†〉|] starts out at approximately
40% of M
[|Ψ†x(x)|] and at the end rises to almost 100%.
Note that this does not indicate that βi is typically close to
0 for all i, just that β† is, compared to 〈x, g†〉.
On MNIST, this ratio is close to 1 up until M [ρ˜(x)] ≈ 2.4,
when it suddenly and quickly falls below 0.5. This drop
is consistent with what we see in Figure 3: At around the
same point this drop occurs, the alignment starts to saturate.
While an increase in the model’s median robustness should
imply an increase in the model’s median alignment, the
deviation from linearity weakens the connection between
robustness and alignment, such that the two effects roughly
cancel out.
In Figure 10, we provide examples for the different gradient
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Figure 9. On the ImageNet experiments, the linear term |〈x, g†〉|
takes up an increasing portion of the binarized score Ψ†(x). In
the case of MNIST, Ψ†(x) is completely dominated by the linear
term, before its influence decreases sharply at M [ρ˜(x)] ≈ 2.4.
concepts we introduced in Theorems 2 and 3, both for the
most robust and non-robust network from our experiment
cohort.
5. Conclusion and Outlook
In this paper, we investigated the connection between a
neural network’s robustness to adversarial attacks and the
interpretability of the resulting saliency maps. Motivated
by the binary, linear case, we defined the alignment α as a
measure of how much a saliency map matches its respective
image. We hypothesized that the perceived increase in
interpretability is due to a higher alignment and tested this
hypothesis on models trained on MNIST and ImageNet.
While on average, the proposed relation holds well, the
connection is much less pronounced for individual points,
especially on ImageNet. Using some upper bounds for the
robustness of a neural network, which we derived using
a decomposition theorem, we arrived at the conclusion
that the strength of this connection is strongly linked with
how similar to a linear model the neural network is locally.
As ImageNet is a comparatively complex problem, any
sufficiently accurate model is bound to be very non-linear,
which explains the difference to MNIST.
While this paper shows the general link between robustness
and alignment, there are still some open questions. Since
we only used one specific robustification method, further
experiments should determine the influence of this method.
One could explore, whether a different choice of norm
leads to different observations. Another future direction of
research could be to investigate the degree of (non-)linearity
and its connection to this topic. While Theorems 2 and
3 illustrate how the pointwise linearized robustness and
alignment may diverge, depending on terms like g, g†, γ
and β†, a more in-depth look should focus on why and when
these terms have a certain relationship to each other.
From a methodological standpoint, the discovered connec-
tion may also serve as an inspiration for new adversarial
defenses, where not only the robustness but also the align-
ment is taken into account. One way of increasing the
alignment directly would be through the penalty term
λ
(‖x‖2‖∇Ψi(x)‖2 − 〈x,∇Ψi(x)〉2) ,
which is bounded from below by 0 via the Cauchy-Schwarz
inequality. Any robustifying effects of the increased align-
ment may however be confounded with the Lipschitz-
penalty that the first summand effectively introduces, which
necessitates a careful experimental evaluation.
∇Ψi∗ (x) ∇Ψi∗ (ξ) ∇Ψj∗ (x) ∇(Ψi∗ −Ψj∗ )(x)
Figure 10. Selected examples from the ImageNet validation set
of the different gradients and their respective alignments with x,
respectively ξ. The odd rows are generated with the most robust
ImageNet classifier, whereas the even rows are generated by the
least robust classifier. The gradient images are individually scaled
to fit the color range [0, 255].
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Appendix
Proof of Equation (3): Note that
F (x+ e) 6= F (x)
⇔ 〈x+ e, z〉〈x, z〉 < 0
⇔ 〈e, z〉 > |〈x, z〉|.
The left-hand side is clearly maximized for e = ‖e‖ z‖z‖ ,
leading to
‖e‖‖z‖ > |〈x, z〉|.
This proves the claim by taking the infimum over ‖e‖.
Lemma 1. Let F be a classifier with locally affine score
function Ψ. Assume l(x) ≥ ρ(x). Then
ρ(x) = min
j 6=i∗
Ψi
∗
(x)−Ψj(x)
‖∇Ψi∗(x)−∇Ψj(x)‖ , (8)
for i∗ := F (x) the predicted class at x.
Proof. As l(x) ≥ ρ(x), we can take the infimum in (1) over
all perturbations in the local affine component, i.e. e with
‖e‖ ≤ l(x) only. This allows us to reformulate
F (x+ e) 6= F (x)
⇔ ∃j 6= i∗ : Ψj(x+ e) > Ψi∗(x+ e)
⇔ ∃j 6= i∗ : 〈∇Ψj(x)−∇Ψi∗(x), e〉 > Ψi∗(x)−Ψj(x).
The infimum over ‖e‖ is achieved by choosing e as a mul-
tiple of ∇Ψj(x) − ∇Ψi∗(x). A direct computation then
finishes the proof.
Proofs of Homogenization results
Lemma 3 (Euler’s Homogeneous Function Theorem). Let
f : Rm → R be a positive one-homogeneous function that
is continuously differentiable on Rm\{0}. Then
f(x) = 〈∇f(x), x〉
Proof. First note that
∂if(ax) = lim
t→0
f(ax+ tei)− f(ax)
t
= lim
t→0
f(ax+ atei)− f(ax)
at
= ∂if(x).
Hence
f(x) =
∫ 1
0
〈∇f(tx), x〉 dt = 〈∇f(x), x〉
Lemma 2 (Linearized Robustness of Homogeneous Clas-
sifiers). Consider a classifier F with positive one-
homogeneous score functions. Then
ρ˜(x) = α†(x). (12)
Proof. Direct consequence of 3.
Definition 5 (Neural Networks). Define the class of neural
networks N to be any network built on learnable affine
transforms (convolutional layers, dense layers) with linear
weights Θ and biases b and ReLU or leaky ReLU activations.
The network can include arbitrary skip-connections, batch-
normalization layers and max or average pooling layers
of arbitrary window size. This in particular includes many
state-of-the-art classification networks.
Lemma 4 (Homogeneous Networks). For fixed x, consider
the logit ΨiΘ,b(x) of a network ΨΘ,b ∈ N , where Θ denotes
the linear weights and b the bias vector of the network. Then
the function
f : y 7→ Ψi
Θ,b
‖y‖
‖x‖
(y),
f is positive one-homogeneous and f(x) = ΨiΘ,b(x).
Proof. Consider first a network consisting of a single
layer with linear transform A and bias b with ReLU non-
linearity. The associated network function is hence given by
ΨA,b(x) = (Ax+ b)+. For this network, we compute for x
fixed and any y and a > 0 as
f(ay) =
(
A(ay) + b
‖ay‖
‖x‖
)
+
=
(
a ·Ay + a · b‖y‖‖x‖
)
+
= af(y).
A single layer is hence positive one-homogeneous. A
function consisting of compositions of positive one-
homogeneous functions is positive one-homogeneous itself
as well, the function f associated to a network consisting
of affine transforms and ReLU activations is positive one-
homogeneous. All of the operations skip-connections, batch-
normalization layers and max or average pooling are posi-
tive one-homogeneous as well, thus proving the claim.
Theorem 1 (Homogeneous Decomposition of Neural Net-
works). Let ΨiΘ,b be any logit of a neural network with
ReLU activations (of class N in the appendix). Denote by
Θ the linear filters and by b the bias terms of the network.
Then
ΨiΘ,b(x) = 〈x,∇xΨiΘ,b(x)〉+ 〈b,∇bΨiΘ,b(x)〉
= 〈x,∇xΨiΘ,b(x)〉+
∑
k
bk∂bkΨ
i
Θ,b(x).
(13)
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Proof. Let f be the functions associated with the network
ΨiΘ,b as in Lemma 4. Then by Lemma 3 we can compute
the value of f at the point x via
f(x) = 〈x,∇yf(y)|y=x〉.
Note that by construction f(x) = ΨiΘ,b(x). We compute
the gradient of f at the point x explicitly as
∇yf(y)|y=x = ∇xΨiΘ,b(x) +
x
‖x‖2 〈b,∇bΨ
i
Θ,b(x)〉.
Combining these results shows
f(x) = 〈x,∇xΨiΘ,b(x) +
x
‖x‖2 〈b,∇bΨ
i
Θ,b(x)〉〉
= 〈x,∇xΨiΘ,b(x)〉+ 〈b,∇bΨiΘ,b(x)〉.
Recall the notation i∗ = F (x) and j∗ for the minimizer in
j in (9).
Theorem 2. Let g := ∇Ψi∗(x). Furthermore, let
g† := ∇(Ψi∗ −Ψj∗)(x) and β† := βi∗(x)−βj∗(x). Then
ρ˜(x) ≤ α†(x) + |β
†|
‖g†‖ (14)
≤ α(x) + ‖x‖ · ‖g† − g‖+ |β
†|
‖g†‖ . (15)
Proof. We have
ρ˜(x) =
Ψi
∗
(x)−Ψj∗(x)
‖∇Ψi∗(x)−∇Ψj∗(x)‖
=
〈x,∇Ψi∗(x)−∇Ψj∗(x)〉+ βi∗(x)− βj∗(x)
‖∇Ψi∗(x)−∇Ψj∗(x)‖
=
∣∣∣∣〈x, g†〉+ β†‖g†‖
∣∣∣∣ ≤ α†(x) + |b†|‖g†‖ ,
using the decomposition theorem and the triangle inequality.
Further,
α†(x) +
|b†|
‖g†‖
=
∣∣〈x, g†〉∣∣+ |b†|‖g†‖
=
∣∣〈x, g† − g + g〉∣∣+ |b†|‖g†‖
≤ |〈x, g〉|+ ∣∣〈x, g† − g〉∣∣+ |b†|‖g†‖
≤ α(x) + ‖x‖ · ‖g† − g‖+ |b
†|
‖g†‖ ,
using the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality.
Theorem 3. Let ξ := x + β
†
‖g†‖
g†
‖g†‖ and γ := ∇Ψi
∗
(ξ),
with g† and β† defined as in the previous theorem. Then
ρ˜(x) ≤ |〈ξ, γ〉|‖γ‖ + ‖ξ‖ · ‖g
† − γ‖, (16)
and if additionally F (x) = F (ξ), then
ρ˜(x) ≤ α(ξ) + ‖ξ‖ · ‖g† − γ‖.
Proof. We have
ρ˜(x) =
〈x, g†〉+ β†〈 g†‖g†‖2 , g†〉
‖g†‖
=
〈x+ β†‖g†‖ g
†
‖g†‖ , g
†〉
‖g†‖
= 〈ξ, g†〉 = 〈ξ, g† − g + g〉
≤ |〈ξ, γ〉|+ ‖ξ‖ · ‖g† − γ‖,
using the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality in the same way as in
the last theorem.
MNIST Model Architecture
Here we describe the architecture that was used for the
MNIST models.
Conv2D (3× 3, ’same’), 32 feature maps, ReLU
Max Pooling (factor 2)
Conv2D (3× 3, ’same’), 64 feature maps, ReLU
Max Pooling (factor 2)
Conv2D (3× 3, ’same’), 128 feature maps, ReLU
Max Pooling (factor 2)
Dense Layer (128 neurons), ReLU
Dropout (0.5)
Softmax
